A RATIONALIZATION OF TRUST SURCHARGE CASES
By JAmEs A. MooRE t
With the world depression of the nineteen thirties now behind us
and with at least one wing of economic thought issuing dire predictions
of an early and equally drastic crash, it is timely to consider a type
of litigation which sprouts from economic depression as naturally as
weeds from loam-namely; attempts to hold fiduciaries responsible for
losses in trust asset values occurring in times of disrupted economic
conditions. At this time, when it is possible to review the cases on this
topic from an objective point of view and with proper perspective, we
can learn lessons from the past which may be important and useful
in the future.
In the trust surcharge cases which have arisen after past depressions, the courts have usually taken a very practical approach and
nearly always have arrived at what appears to be a sound result. In
doing this they have adopted a number of tests against which they have
weighed the actions of the fiduciary who is accused of maladministration. The tests adopted are logical enough in themselves, but they
have never been woven into a single logical pattern. What the courts
have done is to consider any pertinent factors, lump them together,
cite a few cases which involve a similar tactual set-up, and finally
arrive at their own conclusion on the particular case. Although this
approach has not resulted in inequity, it has resulted in confusion. The
purpose of this article is to attempt to reduce that confusion by
analyzing the factors which have had a bearing on the cases, and by
submitting an approach that appears to be logical and in accord with
the trend of actual judicial decisions. Such an approach would provide
a starting point in legal research and, perhaps more important, in
the preparation of cases for trial. It might also be of assistance to
fiduciaries by making somewhat clearer the minimum the law requires
of them in the performance of their duties.
*Any attempt at pigeonholing, such as is necessarily involved here,
is obviously a risky matter. The law can be oversimplified, and things
that are gray can be made to appear black or white. This is particularly true where the courts themselves have not, at least on the surI A. B., 1936, University of Kentucky; LL. B., 1939, Harvard University; member of the Philadelphia Bar; author, When Is a Sale Not a Sale, TAXES, THE TAX
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face, made such an attempt. Yet a careful reading of case after case
on this subject leaves the reader with an impression of the whole body
of the law that cannot be obtained by study of any one case or group of
cases.' The full picture is in the reported cases, but the outlines are
blurred and should be brought into proper focus.
Typical of the cases being considered here is one in which a
fiduciary receives from a decedent 2 securities A, B, and C. He retains
A, sells B and C, and invests the proceeds in D. A and D suffer sharp
losses, and the beneficiaries complain that the losses were caused by the
negligence of the fiduciary.
A case of this type is very similar to an ordinary negligence case,
and it is submitted that the fundamental approach used there is equally
applicable here. In either case, it must first be determined to what
standard of care the defendant (or fiduciary) should be held; next,
whether, under the evidence, he has met that standard, and finally, if
he has not, whether he can successfully plead an affirmative defense.
As is the case with all analogies, this one can be carried too far.
Despite the basic similarity, there are many differences between trust
surcharge and torts cases and the torts law terminology used above
is perhaps misleading. However, the author believes that the results
of the cases justify this terminology.
The answer to each of the three questions posed above must
depend upon a consideration of many factors which bear upon that
question. This does not mean that a mathematical computation is
possible. Some factors, when present, are nearly always important,
while others are of use only to tip delicately balanced scales in a close
case. Furthermore, the weight of a given factor will vary in different
cases depending upon the circumstances. Sometimes one or two
factors will be so strong that the others can be largely discounted. Certain combinations of factors nearly always produce the same result.
Generally speaking, however, all of the factors which have been given
weight by the courts in the past should be considered before a final con1. The author has read a large mass of these cases, but does not pretend to have
examined all of them. Research has been largely concentrated on Massachusetts, New
York and Pennsylvania cases. The greatest body of law on this subject has grown
up in these States, and the cases from the other jurisdictions that have been read indicate that the law of these three States is representative: Massachusetts of the "prudent
man" rule, New York and Pennsylvania of the "legal list" rule. Surprisingly, it will
often be found that a case from another jurisdiction, whether it be prudent man or
legal list, will cite decisions of both Massachusetts and New York to support the conclusion reached. See, for example, In re McCann's Will, 212 Minn. 233, 3 N. W. 2d
226 (1942). Actually, this practice is not so illogical as it would at first seem; as will
appear later, the theories underlying many of the factors that go into the decision of
a trust surcharge case are just the same in both types of State.
2. For purposes of simplification the word "decedent" is used throughout this article to mean either a testator who has established a testamentary trust or a settlor of
an inter vivos trust. With certain minor exceptions, the rules pertaining to eaci are
the same.
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clusion is reached. Naturally, other factors which have not been considered in past cases could become important in future ones, but for
obvious reasons this article is limited to those which have assumed
at least some importance in the decided cases. These have in turn been
classified and each placed under the principal heading on which it
bears.
A. STANDARD OF CARE
(1) The "normal" standard
In arriving at the standard of care by which the fiduciary's conduct is to be tested, it is necessary first to determine what the "normal"
standard is. This is a matter of the basic law of trust administration
of the state whose law governs the case. When the courts of this
country were faced with demands for surcharging fiduciaries, this was
the first question they had to decide. Suprisingly (in view of later
results) the Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania courts came
up with about the same answers.' These answers all seemed to be based
upon "prudence", or the actions of a "prudent man." It would be
natural to suppose, from the similarity of language employed, that the
approach to the problem would be the same in all three states. However, there was a wide divergence as to what constituted "prudence." "
The Massachusetts court became the founder and leading exponent of
the "prudent man" rule, a common law conception which declares that
equity participations can be proper investments for a prudent man to
make. Since the decision in Harvard College v. Anory,5 many other
states have adopted this rule. Some of these first accepted it as a principle of common law, then made it statutory; in others, a "prudent
man" statute changed the previously-existing law. All of the states 6
3. The rules laid down in the leading cases were:
"All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the
probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested."
Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446, 461 (Mass. 1831).

the trustee is bound to employ such diligence and such prudence in the
care and management, as in general, prudent men of discretion and intelligence in
such matters, employ in their own like affairs."
King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76, 85 (1869).
"Thus, executors and administrators, or trustees, acting with good faith and

without any willful default, or fraud, will not be responsible for any loss that may
arise. All that a court of equity requires from trustees, is common skill, common
prudence, and common caution."
Calhoun's Estate, 6 Watts 185, 188 (Pa. 1837).
4. 2 ScoTT, TRuSTS, g 227.5 (1939).

5. See note 3 mtpra.
6. California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts,

Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

which now follow the rule use the language of Harvard College v.
7
Amory, either exactly or with only slight variations.
The New York court in King v. Talbot 8 had a different theory
of prudence and adopted, as a matter of common law, the English conception that unsecured investments were per se imprudent, and that the
prudent fiduciary should normally restrict himself to a very narrow
class of investments. The Pennsylvania court in Calhoun's Estate9
was already operating under a "legal list" rule imposed by statute, and
its standard of "prudence" was subject to the limitations of that
a
statute.
In the last century the legal list rule was by far the more popular
of the two. Some state constitutions have legal list provisions, and
many other states (including New York) later enacted similar statutes.
Despite the increasing popularity of the prudent man rule today, legal
list statutes are still in force in a majority of the States."0
It can be seen, then, that from an apparently similar beginning,
there soon grew a wide divergence of opinion, drawing the two groups
of states farther apart as the theoretical differences became more apparent. All courts still were guided by the test of prudence, but in one
instance it was prudence within a very limited field, in the other the
scope was much broader.
Some time ago this trend toward markedly different conclusions
was reversed, and in more recent years there has been a marked tendency toward similarity of result under the two rules. Lawyers have
had a good deal to do with this, as it has become standard practice to
put discretionary powers in trust instruments, thus removing the
"legal list" restrictions, and the courts seem to have taken up where
the lawyers left off. As will be illustrated later in this article, the legal
list courts have sometimes gone to rather surprising lengths to avoid
7. In some states, such as Michigan and Minnesota, the standard is that of a prudent man dealing with the property of others.
8. See note 3 supra.
9. Ibid.
10. Most of the statutes are "mandatory"; some are "permissive." Under a mandatory statute the fiduciary, in making investments, is compelled to stay within the
list (usually government bonds and first mortgages on realty) and even within the
list has the duty of exercising prudence. Under a permissive statute, the fiduciary
is protected if he stays within the list and is allowed to go outside the list if he can
show he acted with prudence. In practice these distinctions are not -o important as
would appear. A fiduciary who stays within the limits of a mandatory statute is
rarely surcharged; a fiduciary in a "permissive" state who goes outside the list has
a very heavy burden of proving prudence.
The following states now have legal list statutes: Alabama, Arizona (permissive),
Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maryland (permissive), Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York (doubtful whether permissive or mandatory), North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio (doubtful whether permissive or mandatory), Oklahoma (permissive),
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee (permissive), Utah (permissive), Virginia
(permissive), West Virginia (permissive), Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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literal application of the statute, and where the statute is not directly
involved, the rules governing the conduct of fiduciaries are about the
same in all states.
The distinctions between and similarities of the two rules are best
discussed under the specific headings of this article. It is sufficient
here to point out that, despite the tendency just referred to, it is still
most important to determine initially under what rule of law the
fiduciary is operating. This rule of law is the starting point of the
standard of care: it sets the standard in the first instance, and the other
factors discussed here simply raise or lower in the particular case
the norm established by the legislature or court of last resort of the
state whose law governs the administration of the estate or trust.
(2) Circumstances which vary the "normal" standard
A step beyond the application of the norm, into a consideration of
aberrant factors, is actually in accord with the usual approach, that
the final standard is that of a prudent man "under all the circumstances." Certainly no fault can be found with the logic of this, and
its accurate application would always result in a proper standard of
care being applied. The fault lies not in the logic, but in the vagueness.
It is apparent that "all the circumstances" are going to shift the
"normal" standard upward or downward. The six factors discussed
below are believed to be the most important of these circumstances.
Although it is generally said that the standard of care is determined
by the will and by the law ("prudent man" or "legal list") governing
the conduct of the fiduciary, the cases have shown that the presence of
some or all of certain factors favorable to the fiduciary will cause the
courts to relax their requirements concerning the evidence of his care
and prudence, whereas, if these factors are favorable to the beneficiary, the court will be more strict in judging the fiduciary's conduct.
The net result, then, is that these factors bear in such a way upon the
standard of care to which a fiduciary will be held that they appear to
raise or lower the "normal" standard. 1
(a) What type of fiduciary is involved?
On the face of it, there should be a different measure of responsibility applied to executors and trustees. Executors, on one hand,
have a duty to convert the assets, pay the debts, and then to turn the
distributable remainder over to the beneficiaries. Trustees, on the
11. Another way of putting the same idea would be that the scope of the fiduciary's discretion is broadened or narrowed by these factors. While this seems more
accurate when applied to some of the factors (notably the discretionary powers), it is
not in the final analysis quite so satisfactory over-all as the standard of care terminology.

"
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other hand, have a duty to manage and conserve the estate for the remaindermen and at the same time to produce a fair return for the life
tenant. Thus, trustees have a long-range financial problem to consider, which is not true of the average executor. Peculiarly, this distinction seems to work both ways. In one Pennsylvania case,"2 the
court, in surcharging an executor, held that the fact that he was an
executor who had held securities for more than six months (the
statutory period) put upon him a heavy burden of proving care."3 In
another Pennsylvania case,' 4 however, the court seemed to consider
that an executor, with his brief period of stewardship, should be regarded more leniently.' 5
Actually, it is necessary to find out a little more than the simple
fact that an executor is involved. If there are creditors whose rights
are endangered by a policy of retention, the court will usually insist
on enough immediate liquidation to pay all debts.' 6 Some courts have
attached almost as much importance to the rights of pecuniary legatees,' 7 although this is not nearly so clear, since the residuary legatees
are also entitled to have their interests respected.' 8 Where the estate
is clearly sufficient to pay debts and pecuniary .legacies, and the residue
is to be turned over to trustees, the executors do not seem to be held
to any higher standard of care than the trustees who will succeed
12. Curran's Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C. 103 (0. Ct. 1933).
13. If the executors put up a strong enough case under the "evidence of care"
factors, they will be held to have met the burden. For example, in Dauler's Estate,
247 Pa. 356, 93 Atl. 511 (1915), the court held that retention by executors for si-c
years was justified, where decedent had been a director of the company and there was
a financial crash soon after his death, resulting in a very narrow market. In Matter
of Estate of Weston, 91 N. Y. 502 (1883), executors with a duty to sell were allowed
to retain because of the unusual conditions resulting from the panic of 1873.
14. Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518, 121 AtI. 310 (1923). The court said, at p. 526:
". .. the rule in respect to holding non-legal securities owned by a decedent,
which governs executors and other personal representatives, with their presumably
short-duration trusts, should, for obvious reasons, be more liberal than that governing trustees fixed with the duty of managing an estate during a long period of
years."
15. See also Seamans' Estaie, 333 Pa. 358, 5 A. 2d 208 (1939).
16. Elverson's Estate, 15 Pa. D. & C. 383 (0. Ct. 1931) ; see also Reiley v. Healey,
122 Conn. 64, 187 Atl. 661 (1936). In Stewart's Appeal, 110 Pa. 410, 6 Atl. 321
(1885), the court, in refusing to surcharge, relied on the fact that creditors' rights
were not involved.
17. In Curran's Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C. 103 (0. Ct. 1933), the fact that there were
pecuniary legatees outweighed the background of decedent, the evidence of care submitted, and the fact that the securities were sound. See also Matter of Stumpp, 153
Misc. 92, 274 N. Y. Supp. 466 (Surr. Ct. 1934) and Mellier's Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C.
595 (0.Ct. 1933), aff'd, 312 Pa. 157, 167 Atl. 358 (1933).
But cf. Matter of Kent, 146 Misc. 155, 261 N. Y. Supp. 698 (Surr. Ct. 1932),
aff'd, 246 App. Div. 604, 284 N. Y. Supp. 976 (1st Dept. 1935), leave to appeal denied,
270 N. Y. 675 (1936), in which there were debts and specific legacies that nearly
equalled the total assets of the estate at date of death, but the heavier burden was met
by strong evidence of care.
18. Matter of Andrews, 239 App. Div. 32, 265 N. Y. Supp. 386 (2d Dept. 1933);
Gardner's Estate, 323 Pa. 229, 185 Atl. 804 (1936) ; Borell's Estate, 256 Pa. 523, 100
Atl. 953 (1917).
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them,' 9 and there is some indication, as can be inferred from the dictum
in Taylor's Estate2 0 that they will actually be treated more leniently. 2'
However, a fair general rule to be gathered from all the cases is that
only in rare situations is the trustee's burden heavier. Normally the
executor will be faced with an equal or greater burden of proof of care
than the trustee. How much greater will depend on the facts of the
case with respect to size of the estate in relation to debts and pecuniary
legacies, and to the presence or absence of a continuing trust. Also,
as will be discussed later, the attitude of the beneficiaries will influence
the question.
A less important "standard of care" problem is that of the professional trustee. There has been some discussion in the textbooks 22
but very little in the way of court decisions, to the effect that a professional trustee (nearly always a corporation) should be held to a somewhat higher standard of care than an amateur. This is based on the
theory that a professional holds himself out to the public as more
capable than an amateur in handling fiduciary matters, and should
therefore live up to his representations. An adequate answer would
seem to be that any one who accepts a trust should accept all of the
duties, and that the standard should not vary just because of the
nature or character of the trustee. The professional trustee theory has
received tentative acceptance in some cases,23 but has apparently been
rejected in others.24
(b) Was the fiduciary retaining decedent's investments or making
an investment himself f
In the "legal list" states, this question (in the absence of a discretionary power) is all-important. A trustee who has cash to invest
is required to place it in investments specifically authorized by statute,
If he does not do so, he becomes an insurer against loss as to the
19. Matter of Winburn, 140 Misc. 18, 249 N. Y. Supp. 758 (Surr. Ct. 1931);
Mitchell's Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C. 225 (0. Ct. 1934). But cf. Matter of Buck, 184
Misc. 29, 52 N. Y. S. 2d 294 (Surr. Ct. 1944), which, incidentally, can hardly be
reconciled with Matter of Kent, supra note 17.
20. See note 14 supra.
21. This idea was carried out in Mclnnes v. Whitman, 313 Mass. 19, 46 N. E. 2d
527 (1943), in which the executor (who had also actually performed as trustee) was
allowed retention without surcharge for an estimated "normal" period of estate settlement, but was then surcharged as trustee for holding beyond that time.

22. ScoTT,

TRUSTS,

§ 174.1 (1939);

RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS,

§ 227, comment (d)

(1935) ; BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 541 (1946).
23. See Estate of Busby, 288 Ill. App. 500, 6 N. E. 2d 451 (1937) ; New England
Trust Co. v. Paine, 317 Mass. 542, 59 N. E. 2d 263 (1945), 320 Mass. 482, 70 N. E. 2d 6
(1946) ; Matter of Baker, 249 App. Div. 265, 292 N. Y. Supp. 122 (4th Dept. 1936) ;
Darling Stores, Inc. v. Fidelity-Bankers Trust Co., 178 Tenn. 165, 156 S. W. 2d 419
(1941) ; Allis' Estate, 191 Wisc. 23, 209 N. W. 945 (1926).
24. Security Trust Co. v. Appleton, 303 Ky. 328, 197 S. W. 2d 70 (1946) ; Matter
of Flint, 240 App. Div. 217, 269 N. Y. Supp. 470 (2d Dept. 1934), aff'd, 266 N., Y. 607,
195 N. E. 221 (1935) ; Linnard's Estate, 299 Pa. 32, 148 Atl. 912 (1930).
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unauthorized investments.2 5 If he does keep within the class, he
is still required to observe the rule of prudence,26 but it would take a
strong case of negligence to result in surcharge.
The situation is quite different when the fiduciary retains investments of the decedent. The courts pay lip service to the legal list
rule, but the results of the decided cases show that the underlying
principles of the prudent man rule have somehow crept in. At first
it was said that a legal list fiduciary must dispose promptly of investments not on the list. Soon the "promptly" became "within a reasonable time." Some of the courts, particularly the Pennsylvania courts,
have then given the fiduciary a surprising degree of discretion in determining what is a reasonable time. Retention has sometimes been allowed for periods of years, and one leading Pennsylvania case27 held
that the only effect of the presence of retained non-legal securities in
the portfolio was to place the burden of proving prudence on the fiduciary.2" New York has not gone that far, but its cases have also
shown a marked sympathy for the fiduciary who is faced with the
problem of when to dispose of decedent's investments.29
Although this rather liberal attitude of the courts following the
legal list rule seems to bring them very close to the prudent man rule
where the problem of retention is involved, it must be remembered that
there is still a basic distinction between the two rules. The legal list
fiduciary, operating without a discretionary power, knows that he must
sell some time. The court might treat him kindly, should unusual
25. Villard v. Villard, 219 N. Y. 482, 114 N. E. 789 (1916) ; Ackerman v. Emott,
4 Barb. 626 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1848) ; see Matter of Buck, 184 Misc. 29, 52 N. Y. S. 2d
294 (Surr. Ct. 1944) ; Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518, 121 Atl. 310 (1923) ; Berges'
Estate, 30 Pa. D. & C. 549 (0. Ct. 1937).
Naturally, this is not quite true in the "permissive" States, and at least one New
York case seems to have stated that the permissive rule is applicable to New York.
Matter of Cady, 211 App. Div. 373, 207 N. Y. Supp. 385 (4th Dept. 1925).
26. See Matter of Flint, 240 App. Div. 217, 269 N. Y. Supp. 470 (2d Dept. 1934),
aff'd, 266 N. Y. 607, 195 N. E. 221 (1935) ; Matter of Adriance, 145 Misc. 345, 260
N. Y. Supp. 173 (Surr. Ct. 1932) ; Curran's Estate, 17 Pa. D. & C. 435 (0. Ct. 1933),
aff'd, 312 Pa. 416, 167 At. 597 (1933).
Again this rule does not apply to the "permissive" State, where the fiduciary seems
to be protected in legal list investments, and again Matter of Cady, supra note 25, tries
to make New York a "permissive" State.
27. Casani's Estate, 342 Pa. 468, 21 A. 2d 59 (1941).
28. Other Pennsylvania cases which have upheld retention under similar circumstances (though without going quite so far in their language) are: Miller's Estate, 345
Pa. 91, 26 A. 2d 320 (1942) ; Shipley's Estate, 337 Pa. 571, 12 A. 2d 343 (1940) ;
Borell's Estate, 256 Pa. 523, 100 Atl. 953 (1917) ; Stewart's Appeal, 110 Pa. 410, 6
Atl. 321 (1885) ; Coggins' Appeal, 3 Walker 426 (Pa. 1881) ; Mitchell's Estate, 21 Pa.
D. & C. 225 (0. Ct. 1934). In Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518, 121 Atl. 310 (1923),
there is a dictum at p. 528 to the effect that a fiduciary who retains non-legals only
has the burden of showing that the retention represented an "honest exercise of judgment."
29. Matter of Horton, 166 Misc. 768, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 215 (Surr. Ct. 1938) ; Matter
of Kent, 146 Misc. 155, 261 N. Y. Supp. 698 (Surr. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 246 App. Div.
604, 284 N. Y. Supp. 976 (1st Dept. 1935), leave to appeal denied, 270 N. Y. 675
(1936) ; see Matter of Adriance, 145 Misc. 345, 260 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Surr. Ct. 1932);
Matter of Clark, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (1931).
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circumstances cause him to defer sale even for a long period, but he
is always faced with the knowledge that he cannot retain the non-legals
forever, and that every day of retention makes his risk of surcharge
greater. He therefore has to give the matter of sale almost constant
attention, and must submit substantial evidence of care to justify his
retention. In the absence of this, or if the other standard of care
factors mitigate against him, he is likely to be surcharged."
Courts following the prudent man rule, in giving retention a
special status, also seem to have departed somewhat from their own
theory. One of the premises of the prudent man rule is that there is
no difference between retention and investment, a thesis stated as
recently as 1943 by the Massachusetts court.3 1 The idea behind this
is that the trustee is given discretion. Unlike the legal list trustee, if
he sells he may purchase anything that a prudent man would buy, so
that investment, to him, therefore should be the same as retention, and
should call for the same standard of care. However, the theory has
not been carried out in practice. An examination of the cases will
indicate that the proportion of investment surcharges to retention surcharges is very high when contrasted to the proportion of investment
cases to retention cases.
There is sound reason for this result. In the first place, the background of the decedent 3 2 is bound to have an influence. In addition
to this, it is widely agreed among investments experts as well as laymen that sale of a security involves more consideration than refusal
to buy the same security: positive rather than negative action is required, and the seller must possess a definite reason to sell, not simply
a lack of reason not to sell. This distinction between retention and
30. Lewis' Estate, 344 Pa. 586, 26 A. 2d 445 (1942) ; Berges' Estate, 30 Pa. D. &
C. 549 (0. Ct. 1937) ; Curran's Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C. 103 (0. Ct. 1933) ; Seaman's
Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 5 A. 2d 208, 211 (1939), where the court described the limitation
on the right of a legal list fiduciary to retain non-legals as follows:
"The law imposes limitations upon 'ordinary prudence' in such cases in order
to preserve the differentiation between nonlegal and legal securities, and between
fiduciaries and others as to the right to speculate. The mere fact that a trustee
may honestly believe that an unauthorized security will appreciate in value at some
more or less remote period is not sufficient justification for his retention of it in
the trust estate, and 'common prudence' or 'normally good judgment' must not be
deemed to confer such latitude of discretion."
Matter of Baker, 249 App. Div. 265, 292 N. Y. Supp. 122 (4th Dept. 1936). In re
Hamersley's Estate, 180 N. Y. Supp. 887 (Surr. Ct. 1920) and Matter of Yung, 103
Misc. 358, 170 N. Y. Supp. 303 (Surr. Ct. 1918) indicate that there is an automatic
surcharge for retention of non-legals; this is opposed to the cases cited in note 29 supra,
and is certainly not the law in New York. In addition, these cases involve strong
evidence of negligence.
31. McInnes v. Whitman, 313 Mass. 19, 46 N. E. 2d 527 (1943). Accord, Kinmouth v. Brigham, 5 Allen 270 (Mass. 1862).
32. See discussion and cases infra, pp. 659-660. See also Security Trust Co. v.
Appleton, 303 Ky. 328, 197 S.W. 2d 70 (1946) ; North Adams National Bank v. Curtiss, 278 Mass. 471, 180 N. E. 217 (1932). Note also that in Mclnnes v. Whitmanr
there were no other standard of care factors to help the trustee and that in Kinmouth
v. Brigham the retained investment was quite speculative..
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investment is illustrated not only by the "decedent's background" cases
but also by the diversification cases. 33 Finally, a very real legal theory
has been developed by a line of Massachusetts cases; starting with
Bowker v. Pierce." This theory is that retention of a sound security
on a steadily falling market is difficult to criticize. There we have not
only the retention factor but also the "hard times" which always
makes courts sympathetic to the baffled fiduciary. So, although language to the contrary is occasionally found, it can safely be said that
the prudent man courts do distinguish between retention and investment, and that the fiduciary has a better chance in the former case
than in the latter.
It would appear, then, that the legal list states, while bound by
the statute in investment cases, incline toward the prudent man approach in retention cases. The prudent man states, while in a sense
pretending to recognize no distinction between investment and retention, actually do give different treatment to the two problems, thus
recognizing in some measure the much more marked distinction drawn
by the legal list courts. In either type of state, the retaining fiduciary
is not required to live up to such a high standard of care as is the
investing fiduciary.
(c)

What discretionarypowers were containedin the trust instrument?

This factor is obviously of great importance in determining the
standard of care. Any court, in passing upon the actions of a fiduciary, will look at once at the instrument giving him his powers. The
first duty of the probate court is to carry out any wishes of the
decedent that do not conflict with public policy. If the directions in
the trust instrument are explicit enough, they can control the case
absolutely, in the absence of bad faith or such gross negligence that
public policy would be offended by an exoneration.85 The directions
are rarely that specific, with the result that there has been built up in
both prudent man and legal list states a considerable body of law
concerning the effect of various clauses commonly found in trust
instruments.
33. See notes 90, 92 infra.
34. 130 Mass. 262, 264 (1881)
"We can now see that it would have been wiser to sell the stock. But in
judging his acts, we should put ourselves in his position at the time. He was considering the question, not whether he should invest in the stock, but whether he
should sell the stock bought by the testator, upon a falling market."
Accord, Kimball v. Whitney, 233 Mass. 321, 123 N. E. 665 (1919); Green v. Crapo,
181 Mass. 55, 62 N. E. 956 (1902).
35. See the "exculpatory clause" cases cited in note 108 infra. This logic would
apply with almost equal force where there was a specific direction to sell, purchase or
retain a certain security. Cf. Nelligan v. Long, 320 Mass. 439, 70 N. E. 2d 175 (1946) ;
First National Bank of Boston v. Truesdale Hospital, 288 Mass. 35, 192 N. E. 150

(1934).
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In a legal list state, a discretionary power is given great consideration. A power to invest in "non-legals" radically alters the entire
picture of the administration, and probably gives the fiduciary even
greater opportunity for exercise of discretion than the trustee has in a
prudent man state.3" Because of the comparative liberality of the legal
list courts in a retention case, even in the absence of an express power
to retain, the effect of such a retention power is not quite so noticeable
on the surface as that of a power to invest. In some cases it is said
that all it does is shift the burden of proof; " others give it considerably more weight. 8 But irrespective of what the courts say, their
holdings are clear: the legal list cases are almost unanimous in having refused to surcharge a fiduciary who retained under a power.
Naturally this does not mean that it could not be done or that it has
not been done,3" but the actual results are nonetheless impressive, and
indicate the great respect the courts have for the expressed wishes of
the decedent.
36. In Detre's Estate, 273 Pa. 341, 117 Atl. 54 (1922), the court said at p. 350, in
refusing to surcharge for a non-legal investment:
"Furthermore, a trustee -will not be held personally liable for an honest exercise of a discretionary power, in the absence of supine negligence or wilful default."
Accord, Matter of Beadleston, 146 Misc. 548, 262 N. Y. Supp. 507 (Surr. Ct. 1933);
Clay's Estate, 25 Pa. Dl. & C. 257 (0. Ct. 1936). In King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76
(1869), a discretionary power was held ineffective to add to the trustee's powers; later
cases seem to have interpreted this to mean that the particular power granted was not
sufficient. Certainly the New York cases now give full weight to a discretionary investment power. See cases cited in Note, 99 A. L. R. 909, 912 et seq. (1935).
37. Glauser's Estate, 350 Pa. 192, 38 A. 2d 64 (1944) ; Stirling's Estate, 342 Pa.
497, 21 A. 2d 72 (1941) ; Clay's Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C. 257 (0. Ct. 1936).
Although the will apparently contained an exculpatory clause, the court in Matter
of Clark, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (1931) went only so far as to say that tnere
must (for surcharge) at least be evidence of lack of reasonable care.
38. Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 135 Atl. 112 (1926); Bartol's Estate, 182 Pa.
407, 38 Atl. 527 (1897). In Jones' Estate, 344 Pa. 100, 23 A. 2d 434 (1942) the court
first said that the power to retain shifted the burden of proof, then seemed to apply
the "supine negligence" rule. In Dempster's Estate, 308 Pa. 153, 162 Atl. 447 (1932),
the power to retain, combined with a narrow market and decedent's background, was
sufficient to overcome the fact that the securities retained were such as would normally
be frowned on by either a legal list or prudent man court. These factors, though
given different emphasis between themselves, would probably have caused the same
result in Massachusetts.
Edward's Estate, 6 Pa. D. & C. 121 (0. Ct. 1925) puts the effect of the power to
retain on what seems to be its most logical basis when the court says, at p. 123:
"The liability of the trustee in cases of retention of the testator's investments
must, therefore, be the same as it would be if he, without any testamentary provisions on the subject, had invested in the classes of securities specified in the act
of assembly. If this be so, it follows that the responsibility of the trustee must be
measured by his exercise of such diligence and care as a man of ordinary prudence
would practice in the care of his own estate."
In the Matter of Winburn, 140 Misc. 18, 20, 249 N. Y. Supp. 758, 762 (Surr. Ct.
1931), the court said:
"Such provisions [absolving of duty to sell] are in themselves protection to
these executors unless there is proof of fraud or gross negligence."
39. For example, in Matter of Booth, 147 Misc. 353, 264 N. Y. Supp. 773 (Surr.
Ct. 1933), the court surcharged despite a power to retain. Although the court does
not indicate what effect the power to retain had, it was not enough to overcome the
failure of the fiduciary to sell when its own committee recommended sale. In this case
it could be said that the standard of care was low (as is indicated by the very slight
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These results in a legal list state might be said to be natural; bars
were erected by the legislature, but they could be torn down by the
decedent; when torn down, they are torn all the way down. In a
prudent man state this rationale would not apply. There the fundamental rule of trust administration gives to the fiduciary an ample
discretion so that any words of the decedent giving him discretion
would therefore seem to be repetitious and neither add to his power nor
detract from the possibility of liability. Where investment is concerned, at least a few cases bear this out.4" Where retention is involved, it has been said that the only helpful clause is an exculpatory
one, 4 but the cases seem to contradict this, and to give real weight to
4
a power to retain.

2

From the above, the conclusion can be drawn that the best defense
with which a legal list trustee can start off is a discretionary power.
Where there is one, the burden on the beneficiary is very heavy, and
a strong case of negligence must be presented. The effect of such a
power is not quite so great in a prudent man state, but it is still an
important factor, and a court is likely to require of the beneficiary a
evidence of care needed to absolve the fiduciary for retaining other investments) but
that the action of the fiduciary did not measure up even to that standard.
However, in Matter of Clark, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (1931), the failure
of a trustee operating under an exculpatory clause (which was treated by the court
about as a power to retain would be) to sell after its own committee recommended
sale, did not result in surcharge.
40. Davis, Appellant, 183 Mass. 499, 67 N. E. 604 (1903) ; accord, Mattocks v.
Moulton, 84 Me. 545, 24 Atl. 1004 (1892); St. Germain's Adm'r. v. Tuttle, 114 Vt.
263, 44 A. 2d 137 (1945). But see Brown v. French, 125 Mass. 410 (1878).
41. Shattuck, The Massachusetts Prudent Man in Trust Investments, 25 B. U. L.
REv. 307, 341 (1934), says:
"The result is that the words are not deemed to add anything to the prevailing rule."
This statement seems to be meant to apply to powers to retain as well as powers to
invest. Scott distinguishes between powers to retain and powers to invest, giving the
former greater weight. 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS, §§ 227.14, 230.1 (1939).
42. Although no specific discretionary power was given in Harvard College v.
Amory, 9 Pick. 446 (Mass. 1831), the will indicated great confidence in the trustee,
and the court in relying upon this fact said, at p. 461 :
"These trustees are not to be made chargeable but for gross neglect and wilful mismanagement."
Note similarity of this statement with the one made by the Pennsylvania court in
Detre's Estate, 273 Pa. 341, 117 Atl. 54 (1922), cited .upra note 36.
A power to retain "stock in mining companies and any other securities or property of any kind which may be found in my estate" was given effect in Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Shaw, 261 Mass. 158, 158 N. E. 530 (1927), even though 9/13ths of the
estate was in securities normally considered improper.
In In re McCann's Will, 212 Minn. 233, 3 N. W. 2d 226 (1942), the will contained
exculpatory words, but the court construed the clause as a power to retain and gave
effect to it as such. The decisions in Peck v. Searle, 117 Conn. 573, 169 Atl. 602
(1933) and Fairleigh v. Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co., 335 Mo. 360, 73 S. W. 2d
248 (1934) and a dictum in North Adams National Bank v. Curtiss, 278 Mass. 471,
180 N. E. 217 (1932) also support this view.
Where the power is specifically directed to a given investment, an even stronger
case is presented, and there is no question but that the power will be given considerable
weight in a prudent man State. Nelligan v. Long, 320 Mass. 439, 70 N. E. 2d 175
(1946) ; First National Bank of Boston v. Truesdale Hospital, 288 Mass. 35, 192 N. E.
150 (1934).
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better case than it would if no power were present. This is particularly
true where a retention under a power to retain is involved.
(d) What was the decedent's background?
On this issue there might be some fine theoretical distinction
between the legal list and prudent man states, arising from the argument that prudent man states give discretion anyway and that it cannot be enlarged by such a thing as background of the decedent. If so,
it is not visible to the naked eye. All courts recognize and place great
emphasis upon this factor. The ultimate facts that are usually considered important are: (a) that decedent had been active in the industry or corporation in question, and/or (b) that decedent as an
investor had shown great confidence in the industry or corporation.
The cases, starting with Harvard College v. Amory, abound with
illustrations of both of these situations.4" It rarely happens that a
trustee is surcharged where he can show that he retained a security in
a company in which decedent had been very active during his lifetime.
The case is not quite so strong where decedent had only the confidence
of an investor, but the fact that he had placed unusual confidence in a
particular company or industry is always given weight by the courts.
The usual way of proving this background is by indirect testimony-evidence of decedent's activities during his life. However,
more direct testimony is also admissible, always (at least theoretically)
simply to show the background, though not to vary the terms of the
will. Letters of the decedent have been admitted for this purpose,44
and even testimony of oral statements. 45
The rationale of this seems at first to be somewhat elusive, but
actually is not. It can be argued that the fiduciary is governed only
by the will and by normal standards of conduct, that he is just as
negligent in retaining decedent's pet investment as he is in buying or
retaining any other investment, and that the same standard should
43. Actively-Poor v. Hodge, 311 Mass. 312, 41 N. E. 2d 21 (1942) ; In re McCann's Will, 212 Minn. 233, 3 N. W. 2d 226 (1942) ; Warmack v. Crawford, 195 S. W.
2d 919 (Mo. 1946) ; Fairleigh v. Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co., 335 Mo. 360, 73
S. W. 2d 248 (1934) ; Matter of Easton, 178 Misc. 611, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 546 (Surr. Ct.
1942), aff'd, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 190 (4th Dept. App. Div. 1943).
Investor-Stevens v. Meserve, 73 N. H. 293, 61 Atl. 420 (1905) ; Matter of Winburn, 140 Misc. 18, 249 N. Y. Supp. 758 (Surr. Ct. 1931) ; Coggins' Appeal, 3 Walker
426 (Pa. 1881); Peckham v. Newton, 15 R. I. 321, 4 Atl. 758 (1886); see North
Adams National Bank v. Curtiss, 278 Miss. 471, 180 N. E. 217 (1932) and Stewart's
Appeal, 110 Pa. 410, 6 Atl. 321 (1885).
44. In re McCann's Will, 212 Minn. 233, 3 N. W. 2d 226 (1942) ; Matter of Ryan,
186 Misc. 688, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 462 (Surr. Ct. 1945) ; Matter of Estate of Weston, 91
N. Y. 502 (1883).
45. Poor v. Hodge, 311 Mass. 312, 41 N. E. 2d 21 (1942) ; Matter of Balfe, 152
Misc. 739, 274 N. Y. Supp. 284 (Surr. Ct. 1934), nod., 245 App. Div. 22, 280 N. Y.
Supp. 128 (2d Dept. 1935).
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apply to each. One possible answer is that evidence of what prudent
men thought about the company is admissible; if decedent had been
successful, why not admit this evidence to show what he, as a prudent
man, thought? This answer, however, if valid at all, is certainly
not enough to entitle the evidence, if admitted, to be given much
weight. 46 Conditions on which decedent relied inevitably change, the
management in which he had confidence, and of which he might have
been a part, also changes; what he thought ten or twenty years ago
as to the soundness of a security would have little if any probative
value in itself.
The true answer seems to be that the fiduciary is, after all, trying to carry out the wishes of the decedent; he is trying to be the
"other self" of the decedent, and to continue, so long as they seem
sound, the investment policies that made the decedent a success. The
will is his first guide, and he must always bear in mind the policies of
the court and state which appointed him. But he is also entitled to
judge his policies in the light of what he would normally expect the
decedent's wishes to be.4 Of course, this does not give him the right
to go blindly along, irrespective of what happens in the financial and
business world, but it does give him more leeway than a trustee of a
so-called "normal" trust would have. It must be remembered that
investment policy is largely guesswork; where there is reasonable
cause for doubt as to what steps to take, the benefit of that doubt is
more likely to be given to that trustee who tried to do what he thought
the decedent would have done under similar circumstances. As was
said in Harvard College v. Amory, at p. 462, "The circumstance of
the trustees' reposing confidence where the testator had, is one which
is always to be considered as tending properly to their discharge."
(e) Did the fiduciary act in good or bad faith?
This would appear to be an extraordinary element to list under
"standard of care" factors. Every fiduciary is compelled to act in
good faith; the fact that he did should not entitle him to any particular
respect or make the court feel particularly kindly toward him. If
he acted in bad faith, he should be an insurer against loss arising from
that action.
However, it is not all black or white. A corporate
46. The weight would, of course, vary with the circumstances, depending on the
period of time involved, the degree of change in management and circumstances, etc.
47. Matter of Estate of Weston, 91 N. Y. 502 (1883).
48. See Ball v. Hopkins, 268 Mass. 260, 167 N. E. 338 (1929) ; LORING, A TRUSrn's HANDBOOK, §§ 18, 19 (Shattuck's ed. 1940). See also Matter of Stumpp, 153
Misc. 92, 274 N. Y. Supp. 466 (Surr. Ct. 1934), where the court, in surcharging, relied
almost entirely on the improper motive of the executors in retaining in order to enhance
the possibility of gain to themselves. In addition the court was apparently influenced
by the bad faith of the executors with respect to the creditors of one of them.
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trustee which purchases its own stock, or borrows from itself, might
show that it did so in good faith, but there would still be a stigma
attached to the action, and the trustee's burden becomes correspondingly heavier.4" On the other hand, in some cases trustees have shown
so positively that their actions were performed in the utmost good
faith, with only the best interests of the beneficiaries behind them, that
the courts have seemed inclined to be somewhat more lenient simply
because of this positive proof, rather than bland assumption, of good
faith. ' 0 Naturally this would not go far toward discharging the
fiduciary, but the shadings are sometimes delicate, and it might make
some difference in a close case.
(f) Was there some acquiescence by the complaining parties, though
not enough to create an estoppel?
If it seems illogical to treat good or bad faith as a "standard of
care" factor, it is surely doubly so to put acquiescence in that category.
Technically, acquiescence is an affirmative defense. If it has been
shown that the fiduciary has not measured up to the standard of care
required of him and is therefore prima facie liable for the resulting loss,
he can then prove that the parties in interest acquiesced in the unfortunate decisions and thus avoid liability. This is, in effect, a defense
of estoppel. If he should fail to prove the estoppel, it would seem
that the evidence he has introduced on the subject should be given no
weight at all. However, the law has not gone that far. In some cases
49. It re Sanford, 297 N. Y. 64, 74 N. E. 2d 310 (1947) ; City Bank Farmers' Trust
Co. v. Cannon, 291 N. Y. 125, 51 N. E. 2d 674 (1943); Matter of Junkersfeld, 244
App. Div. 260, 279 N. Y. Supp. 481 (2d Dept. 1935) ; Matter of Hirsch, 116 App. Div.
367, 101 N. Y. Supp. 893 (1st Dept. 1906), aff'd, 188 N. Y. 584, 81 N. E. 1165 (1907);
Berges' Estate, 30 Pa. D. & C. 549 (0. Ct. 1937).
In Casani's Estate, 342 Pa. 468, 21 A. 2d 59 (1941) the decision might well have
been different because of this factor. A dissent pointed out that the individual trustee
was a remainderman, and had expressed himself as refusing to sell, irrespective of
corporate position, until the stocks returned to their inventory value. The majority
apparently ignored this testimony in absolving the trustee.
In Matter of Balfe, 152 Misc. 739, 274 N. Y. Supp. 284 (Surr. Ct. 1934), rood.,
245 App. Div. 22, 280 N. Y. Supp. 128 (2d Dept. 1935), the trustee held its own stock
and also purchased mortgages from itself. However, these considerations were balanced by others, such as decedent's background and a power to retain, and the evidence
showed both care and prudence. In Greenawalt's Estate, 343 Pa. 413, 21 A. 2d 890
(1941), retention of trustee's stock was at least balanced by the power to retain and
the fact that the loss was due primarily to the depression.
50. Bowker v. Pierce, 130 Mass. 262 (1881) ; In re McCann's Will, 212 Minn. 233,
3 N. W. 2d 226 (1942) (trustees held substantial interests in same company, received
no compensation as trustees) ; Matter of Estate of Weston, 91 N. Y. 502 (1883) (executor held same stock individually) ; Dempster's Estate, 308 Pa. 153, 162 At. 447
(1932) ; Stewart's Appeal, 110 Pa. 410, 6 Atl. 321 (1885) (sold own stock at same
time) ; see also Coggins' Appeal, 3 Walker 426 (Pa. 1881).
In Jenks' Estate, 19 Pa. D. & C. 479 (0. Ct. 1933), the executor was commended
for lending the estate money in order to close out a margin account. This is the type
of self-dealing which is frequently subjected to criticism, but here the good faith indicated actually influenced the court the other way.
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acquiescence has been held to be a complete defense; 11 usually the court
has found acquiescence without determining definitely whether or not
there would have been a surcharge if acquiescence had been missing. In
at least one case 52 the court has followed this logic to its ultimate conclusion and surcharged on a percentage basis, holding the trustee liable
to those who had not acquiesced, not liable to those who had.
In a number of cases, however, acquiescence will be mentioned
and apparently relied upon in part by the court in refusing to surcharge. In some of these cases there simply is not sufficient evidence
of acquiescence to set up an estoppel; in others, it appears that there
are some parties in interest who have not, or could not have, acquiesced. To be completely logical in the latter type of case, the court
should apply percentages or, if it be remaindermen who have not
acquiesced, set up a separate fund for them from the surcharge money,
letting the income go to the surcharged trustees until the remainders
come in." In both types of case, the courts have seemed to use
acquiescence along with other factors in refusing to surcharge."' The
only way this can be rationalized is by saying that, where the active
beneficiaries acquiesce, or appear to acquiesce, the discretion of the
trustees is somewhat broader. Thus, by a back door route, partial
acquiescence can conceivably lower the standard of care. Conversely,
a demand for sale raises the standard of care. The fiduciary, after
receiving such a demand, still has the duty of exercising his own judgment, but he is put on notice that at least one party in interest thinks
he should sell, and his refusal places upon him a heavier burden of
proving care and prudence.55 51. Clabby's Estate, 338 Pa. 305, 12 A. 2d 71 (1940) ; Stephens' Estate, 320 Pa.
97, 181 Atl. 559 (1935) ; Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 135 Atl. 112 (1926). In City
Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N. Y. 125, 51 N. E. 2d 674 (1943), it was
held that acquiescence by a settlor with a power to revoke was a good defense even
against an infant remainderman.
52. McInnes v. Whitman, 313 Mass. 19, 46 N. E. 2d 527 (1943).
53. In Matter of Junkersfeld, 244 App. Div. 260, 279 N. Y. Supp. 481 (2d Dept.
1935), an acquiescing widow was estoppped as to her 1/3 share of the residue of the
estate, but was allowed to share as an income beneficiary of the trust, although as coexecutor she was surcharged along with the trust company. It is submitted that she
should not have been allowed to benefit from the surcharge at all, but should have received (as payer of 1/2 the surcharge) only one-half of the additional income resulting
from the surcharge, the other half going to the surcharged trustee. There are several
ways in which this could have been worked out.
54. Gardner's Estate, 323 Pa. 229, 185 Atl. 804 (1936) ; Fairleigh v. Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co., 335 Mo. 360, 73 S. W. 2d 248 (1934) ; Green v. Crapo, 181
Mass. 55, 62 N. E. 956 (1902) ; see Greenawalt's Estate, 343 Pa. 413, 21 A. 2d 890
(1941).
In Casani's Estate, 342 Pa. 468, 21 A. 2d 59 (1941), the court said, at p. 470:
"The field of investment defined by the statute may be enlarged by the will,
by acquiescence of beneficiaries, or in certain cases by order of court."
55. Mellier's Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C. 595 (0. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 312 Pa. 157, 167 Atl.
358 (1933). In Bowker v. Pierce, 130 Mass. 262 (1881) this heavier burden was held
to have been met.
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B.

EVIDENCE OF CARE

It would simplify things considerably if, having examined the
factors making up the standard of care in a particular case, we could
state exactly what the standard was and apply the evidence of care
with mathematical precision to arrive at a result demonstrably accurate. Unfortunately, trust surcharge law is too much a question
of degree to allow for this. However, we do at least have something
to go by in examining the evidence of care and prudence; we should
be able to tell whether this fiduciary is to be measured by a normal
standard, or by one higher or lower than normal. If, for example, we
have a legal list trustee with no powers in the will, who retained for
a long time stock that decedent was not particularly interested in, he
will have to show by convincing evidence that he acted with unusual
care and used sound judgment. If, on the other hand, the same trustee
had a power to retain, and the stock held was in the company which
had built decedent's fortune, he will have a great deal more leeway, and
a very strong case of negligence would have to be presented to result
in surcharge.
Having arrived at a determination of what the standard of care
is to be, we must next examine the fiduciary's actions to see whether
they measured up to it. This in turn breaks down into two sections:
whether he has, in making his decisions, done the precautionary things
that a fiduciary should have done, and whether his actual decisions,
based upon his findings, were sound ones for a fiduciary to make. The
distinction between these two questions, though not often made specifically by the courts," is nonetheless important. The chief reason for
this is that the standard of care factors probably have little bearing on
the first but very decided influence on the second. In other words, a
fiduciary can rarely, if ever, afford to be lazy, but he sometimes can
get by with stupidity, or with what would be held to be stupid, or at
least imprudent, if done by another fiduciary under circumstances
differing from those surrounding the estate or trust he is adminis7
tering.5
56. Two cases that have made this distinction are Reiley v. Healey, 122 Conn.
64, 187 At. 661 (1936) and Dickinson's Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C. 247 (0. Ct. 1934),
aff'd, 318 Pa. 561, 179 Atl. 443 (1935). In the Reiley case the court held that there
was little evidence of actual care, but then said that the conclusion on that point was
unimportant as the crucial question was whether the decision was prudent. This is
probably not law anywhere. The Dickinson case puts it on a much sounder basis, the
court saying (p. 250)
..
. the trustee . . . will be liable to a surcharge only for a failure to
study carefully the circumstances and conditions that controlled the value of the
investments, or, if he has made such a careful study, for failure to act intelligently
with respect thereto."
57. The best illustration of this is a case where, because of a power in the will or
decedent's background, a fiduciary is allowed to retain a security he normally would
be surcharged for retaining. See note 81, infra.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

(1) Has the Fiduciary Given the Estate or Trust Proper Care and
Attention?
Here is where we get the real evidence of care. No matter how
broad the standard, the fiduciary must show that he did not simply let
things slide or make wild, unreasoned guesses. This seems equally
important under either rule, although the prudent man rule might
pretend to lay somewhat greater emphasis on it. The theory behind
this has been stated before: that the discretion given by the prudent
man rule makes the other standard of care factors not quite so important, and the evidence of care more important than in legal list states.
As has been shown, the cases have not borne this out, and it will even
be found that most of the cases which go into the actual evidence of
care with thoroughness are legal list cases.
There are many things a competent fiduciary should do. He
should examine the portfolio with care, inspect the trust instrument,
determine the decedent's objectives, and then shape his policy accordingly. He should study business and market conditions,"' and the
records and reports of the corporation or corporations in which he is
interested.59 He should, if possible, avail himself of inside information
concerning the corporation."0 He should consult with sound and
experienced investors,"' and should study the leading financial periodicals and investment services.6 He should, at least as a matter of
courtesy and probably as a matter of caution, consult with the beneficiaries and ascertain their desires.6 " A corporate fiduciary should
have an investment or finance committee which includes financial
58. Matter of Parsons, 143 Misc. 368, 257 N. Y. Supp. 339 (Surr. Ct. 1932), rood.,
238 App. Div. 883, 262 N. Y. Supp. 957 (3d Dept. 1933) ; Casani's Estate, 342 Pa. 468,
21 A. 2d 59 (1941) ; Mitchell's Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C. 225 (0. Ct. 1934).
59. Brown v. French, 125 Mass. 410 (1878) ; Matter of Bunker, 184 Misc. 316,
56 N. Y. S. 2d 746 (Surr. Ct. 1944) ; Matter of Kent, 146 Misc. 155, 261 N. Y. Supp.
698 (Surr. Ct. 1932), affd, 246 App. Div. 604, 284 N. Y. Supp. 976 (1st Dept. 1935),
leave to appeal denied, 270 N. Y. 675 (1936) ; Jones' Estate, 344 Pa. 100, 23 A. 2d 434
(1942) ; Stirling's Estate, 342 Pa. 497, 21 A. 2d 72 (1941) ; Bartol's Estate, 182 Pa.
407, 38 Atl. 527 (1897) ; Scoville v. Brock, 81 Vt. 405, 70 Atl. 1014 (1908). See Taft
v. Smith, 186 Mass. 31, 70 N. E. 1031 (1904).
60. Matter of Clark, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (1931) ; Jones' Estate, 344 Pa.
100, 23 A. 2d 434 (1942); Dickinson's Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C. 247 (0. Ct. 1934), aff'd,
318 Pa. 561, 179 Atl. 443 (1935) ; Mitchell's Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C. 225 (0. Ct. 1934).
61. Kimball v. Whitney, 233 Mass. 321, 123 N. E. 665 (1919) ; Brown v. French,
125 Mass. 410 (1878) ; Stevens v. Meserve, 73 N. H. 293, 61 Atl. 420 (1905) ; Matter
of Bunker, 184 Misc. 316, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 746 (Surr. Ct. 1944) ; Matter of Horton, 166
Misc. 768, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 215 (Surr. Ct. 1938) ; Casani's Estate, 342 Pa. 468, 21 A. 2d
59 (1941) ; Scoville v. Brock, 81 Vt. 405, 70 At!. 1014 (1908).
62. Matter of Bunker, 184 Misc. 316, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 746 (Surr. Ct. 1944) ; Matter
of Kent, 146 Misc. 155, 261 N. Y. Supp. 698 (Surr. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 246 App. Div.
604, 284 N. Y. Supp. 976 (lst Dept. 1935), leave to appeal denied, 270 N. Y. 675
(1936) ; Stirling's Estate, 342 Pa. 497, 21 A. 2d 72 (1941).
63. Gardner's Estate, 323 Pa. 229, 185 Atl. 804 (1936) ; Bartol's Estate, 182 Pa.
407, 38 Atl. 527 (1897) ; but see Matter of Junkersfeld, 244 App. Div. 260, 279 N. Y.
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experts and which holds frequent meetings at which corporate securities
and estate portfolios are reviewed."4 Any other evidence of care
would, of course, be admissible, as would any evidence that the fiduciary had acted in a careless or slipshod manner.
Any given case is hardly likely to involve all of the above types
of evidence. However, the more positive evidence of this nature submitted by the fiduciary, the better are his chances of avoiding surcharge. By the same token, positive evidence of carelessness, or even
lack of evidence of care, is very likely to lead to surcharge.65
(2) Were the Fiduciary's Decisions Prudent Ones?
In considering this problem, the most important thing to remember at the outset is that hindsight can never validly be applied. Many
investment decisions appear ridiculous years after they were made, but
that is no criterion. The actions taken must be judged in the light
of the circumstances then existing and opinions then prevalent. This
is axiomatic, and has frequently been expressed by the courts in graphic
language.6
Supp. 481 (2d Dept. 1935), where the positive wishes of the widow were given no
weight as against the other beneficiaries.
Consultation with beneficiaries should not be relied upon too strongly, as the
wishes of the life tenant are likely to be opposed to the interests of the remaindermen.
See the wasting asset cases, such as Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 175 N. E. 761
(1931).
64. Matter of Balfe, 152 Misc. 739, 274 N. Y. Supp. 284 (Surr. Ct. 1934), mod.,
245 App. Div. 22, 280 N. Y. Supp. 128 (2d Dept. 1935) ; Jones' Estate, 344 Pa. 100,
23 A. 2d 434 (1942) ; Stirling's Estate, 342 Pa. 497, 21 A. 2d 72 (1941) ; Mitchell's
Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C. 225 (0. Ct. 1934). In Matter of Clark, 257 N. Y. 132, 177
N. E. 397 (1931), the committee met every six months. The court emphasized the
high calibre of the men on the committee, as evidence of the trustee's prudence.
Where, however, the committee had frequent meetings in the first few months
of the administration, but then had no meeting in which the estate was considered for
two and a half years, it was held to be gross negligence-Matter of Junkersfeld, 244
App. Div. 260, 279 N. Y. Supp. 481 '(2d Dept. 1935).
65. In re Ward's Estate, 121 N. J. Eq. 555, 192 Atl. 68 (Prerog. Ct. 1936), aff'd,
121 N. J. Eq. 606, 191 At. 772 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937) ; Matter of Junkersfeld, 244
App. Div. 260, 279 N. Y. Supp. 481 (2d Dept. 1935) ; Blish Trust, 350 Pa. 311, 38 A.
2d 9 (1944) ; Seaman's Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 5 A. 2d 208 (1939).
In Kelch's Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C. 204 (0. Ct. 1934), aff'd by divided court, 318
Pa. 296, 178 Atl. 129 (1935), the court based its surcharge almost entirely on the lack
of evidence of care, concluding that the loss resulted from lack of attention:
"It is most apparent that the trustees, so content with the high character
of the securities and their mechanical and high revenue yield, did nothing. Action
became atrophied."
66. Shipley's Estate (No. 1), 337 Pa. 571, 12 A. 2d 343 (1940), ("There is no rule
of law which requires that an executor's foresight must measure up to the standard
of a legatee's hindsight.") ; Matter of Andrews, 239 App. Div. 32, 265 N. Y. Supp. 386
(2d Dept. 1933) ("Even the witless fool may pose as a paragon of wisdom after the
unforeseeable disaster has occurred"); First National Bank of Boston v. Truesdale
Hospital, 288 Mass. 35, 192 N. E. 150 (1934) ("The trend of a market is notoriously
hard to discover except in retrospect. At every level skilled observers are apt to disagree as to its probable course").
Accord, Green v. Crapo, 181 Mass. 55, 62 N. E. 956 (1902) ; Matter of Clark, 257
N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (1931) ; Matter of Balfe, 152 Misc. 739, 274 N. Y. Supp. 284
(Surr. Ct. 1934), rood., 245 App. Div. 22, 280 N. Y. Supp. 128 (2d Dept. 1935).
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With hindsight ruled out, it is obvious that the question to be considered here is whether the decisions were prudent ones in the light
of circumstances existing at the time they were made. There is a hint
of causation in this question: there is some logic in stating that a
fiduciary who was negligent in failing to meet the tests of actual care
should not be surcharged if a more careful fiduciary would have done
exactly the same thing. 7 However, the courts have rarely taken this
approach, but -rather have considered the factors bearing on this question along with the actual proof of care.
A list of the many elements that would have some bearing in
determining whether a decision had been wise or unwise would be
practically endless; any relevant evidence, if not too remote, would be
admissible. The factors which have been given some weight in the
decided cases can be generally listed under one of the six headings
which are discussed below.
(a) What were otherprudent people doing and saying?
It has already been noted 6 that one of the things a fiduciary
should do is find out what other prudent people were doing and saying.
Whether he was wise in the decision he ultimately made would seem
to depend, in some measure at least, on whether his actions conformed
to the best investment judgment of the day. He can show that company officials,"9 investment services,"0 or other leaders in the investment field " advised the action he took, and that sound investors took
The necessity of this rule against hindsight is nowhere better emphasized than by
the horrible example of the New Jersey judge who, looking back at the catastrophic
1929 market break, said:
"It was common knowledge not only amongst bankers and trust companies
but the general public as well, that the stock market condition at the time of the
testator's death was an unhealthy one, that values were very much inflated, and

that a crash was almost sure to come."

In re Chamberlain, 9 N. J. Misc. 809, 810, 156 Atl. 42, 43 (Prerog. Ct. 1931).
Fortunately for trustees who were not so all-seeing in 1929 as was this judge in 1931,
this comment was later emphatically disapproved by the highest court of New Jersey,
in People's National Bank & Trust Co. of Pemberton v. Bichler, 115 N. J. Eq. 617,
172 Atl. 207 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934).
67. See First National Bank of Boston v. Truesdale Hospital, 288 Mass. 35, 192
N. E. 150 (1934).
68. See p. 664 supra.
69. Bowker v. Pierce, 130 Mass. 262 (1881) ; Matter of Clark, 257 N. Y. 132, 177
N. E. 397 (1931).
70. See In re Cook's Trust Estate, 20 Del. Ch. 123, 171 AtI. 730 (Ch. 1934);
Matter of Winburn, 140 Misc. 18, 249 N. Y. Supp. 758 (Surr. Ct. 1931); Stirling's
Estate, 34 Pa. 497, 21 A. 2d 72 (1941). Where the services advised holding for the
"long pull," the inference is that they did not think very much of the security as a
short term proposition; such evidence is therefore unfavorable to executors faced with
a duty to Day off legatees. Matter of Stummp, 153 Misc. 92. 274 N. Y. Sum). 466
(Surr. Ct. 1934).
71. Kimball v. Whitney, 233 Mass. 321, 123 N. E. 665 (1919) ; Brown v. French,
125 Mass. 410 (1878) ; Fairleigh v. Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co., 335 Mo. 360,
73 S. W. 2d 248 (1934) ; Matter of Clark, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (1931);
Matter of Andrews, 239 App. Div. 32, 265 N. Y. Supp. 386 (2d Dept. 1933) ; Matter
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similar action.72 Following this advice does not by any means absolve
him, since that would be an unwarrantable delegation of fiduciary
duties. But it does show that he was not alone in his views, and it
is difficult to condemn a decision as unsound when it was in accord
with the judgment of men of high standing in the financial world.
(b) What was the financial history of. the investment?
This factor is even more obvious than the last one. A fiduciary
who has purchased or retained a security is certainly in a stronger position if the corporation's books showed a sound financial structure,"8
good earnings 7' and a continuous dividend record 5 than if they
showed spotty earnings, no consistent dividend policy, and a topheavy
capitalization or other evidence of financial weakness. Perhaps not
coming directly under this topic, but certainly closely related to it, is
the management of the company. If the management consists of men
who are believed to be extremely able in their field, the investment
certainly is more easily defended than if made in securities of a company administered by less capable people." 6 As to this, however, it
should be cautioned that hindsight can far more easily steal in than in
of Horton, 166 Misc. 768, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 215 (Surr. Ct. 1938) ; Matter of Parsons, 143
Misc. 368, 257 N. Y. Supp. 339 (Surr. Ct. 1932), mnod., 238 App. Div. 883, 262 N. Y.
Supp. 957 (3d Dept. 1933) ; Casani's Estate, 342 Pa. 468, 21 A. 2d 59 (1941) ; Gardner's Estate, 323 Pa. 229, 185 At. 804 (1936).
72. Green v. Crapo, 181 Mass. 55, 62 N. E. 956 (1902) ; Matter of Estate of
Weston, 91 N. Y. 502 (1883); Matter of Horton, 166 Misc. 768, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 215
(Surr. Ct. 1938).
73. Fairleigh v. Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co., 335 Mo. 360, 73 S. W. 2d
248 (1934) ; Matter of Clark, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (1931) ; Lewis' Estate, 344
Pa. 586, 26 A. 2d 445 (1942) ; Clay's Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C. 257 (0. Ct. 1936) ; St.
Germain's Adm'r. v. Tuttle, 114 Vt. 263, 44 A. 2d 137 (1945). It will be noted that
Lewis' Estate and Clay's Estate rely in some measure on the book value of the stock,
which is giving weight to one of the least persuasive bits of evidence in the corporate
records.
Matter of Winburn, 140 Misc. 18, 249 N. Y. Supp. 758 (Surr. Ct. 1931), has a
very practical summary of the most important elements to be considered under this section. The court says:
"What has been the history of the companies during a period of years? Have
they paid regular dividends of regular amounts? Have they a proper capital
structure? Are they wisely officered? Has a successful business continued over
a period of time? Have they achieved a standing in commercial circles? Have
they behind them an established dividend record over a period of years?"
74. Kimball v. Whitney, 233 Mass. 321, 123 N. E. 665 (1919) ; Clay's Estate, 25
Pa. D. & C. 257 (0. Ct. 1936) ; see Matter of Balfe, 152 Misc. 739, 274 N. Y. Supp.
284 (Surr. Ct. 1934), mod., 245 App. Div. 22, 280 N. Y. Supp. 128 (2d Dept. 1935) ;
Curran's Estate, 17 Pa. D. & C. 423 (0. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 312 Pa. 416, 167 Atl. 597
(1933).
75. Security Trust Co. v. Appleton, 303 Ky. 328, 197 S. W. 2d 70 (1946) ; Green
v. Crapo, 181 Mass. 55, 62 N. E. 956 (1902) ; In re McCann's Will, 212 Minn. 233, 3
N. W. 2d 226 (1942) ; Lexvis' Estate, 344 Pa. 586, 26 A. 2d 445 (1942) ; Seaman's
Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 5 A. 2d 208 (1939) ; St. Germain's Adm'r. v. Tuttle, 114 Vt. 263,
44 A. 2d 137 (1945).
76. Brown v. French, 125 Mass. 410 (1878) ; Fairleigh v. Fidelity National Bank
& Trust Co., 335 Mo. 360, 73 S. W, 2d 248 (1934) ; Matter of Balfe, 152 Misc. 739,
274 N. Y. Supp. 284 (Surr. Ct. 1934), mn~d., 245 App. Div. 22, 280 N. Y. Supp. 128
(2d Dept. 1935).
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the case of the corporate records. Interpretation of the records can be
influenced by the passage of time, but the records themselves will
remain to aid or plague the fiduciary.
(c) Was the investment (or retention) sound or speculative in nature?
One of the basic principles of the law of trust administration is
that a fiduciary has no right, in the absence of very specific authority,
to speculate with his trust funds. The legal list statutes are based
entirely on this premise, most *ofthem considering any equity participation as speculative. The prudent man states are much more liberal in
defining speculation and rely more on the basic soundness of the corporation and other factors, such as the nature of the transaction, in
determining whether there was speculation. The courts in the legal
list states use the same approach when they are not bound by the terms
of the statute.
The type of security and the background of the corporation will
go far toward determining whether the investment is speculative. The
tests prescribed under the preceding subhead will provide a large part
of the answer. Generally speaking, preferred or common stocks, where
not prohibited by statute, in a "well-seasoned" corporation are acceptable for investment and retention. By "well-seasoned" (or similar
phrases) the courts seem to mean corporations which have been in
existence for a substantial period of time, which are leaders in their
field, which have a background of steady earnings and growth, and
whose securities, listed on a recognized exchange, are not particularly
subject to rapid fluctuations in market price." On the other hand,
stock in a recently-formed corporation, 78 or an interest in a trading
partnership, 79 are frowned upon, as are investments in various other
77. See Security Trust Co. v. Appleton, 303 Ky. 328, 197 S. W. 2d 70 (1946) ;
Green v. Crapo, 181 Mass. 55, 62 N. E. 956 (1902) ; Brown v. French, 125 Mass. 410
(1878) ; Lovell v. Minot, 20 Pick. 116 (Mass. 1838) ; Harvard College v. Amory, 9
Pick. 446 (Mass. 1831) ; Matter of Clark, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (1931) ; Matter of Kent, 146 Misc. 155, 261 N. Y. Supp. 698 (Surr. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 246 App. Div.
604, 284 N. Y. Supp. 976 (1st Dept. 1935), leave to appeal denied, 270 N. Y. 675
(1936) ; Jenks' Estate, 19 Pa. D. & C. 479 (0. Ct. 1933) ; Warmack v. Crawford, 195
S. W. 2d 919 (Mo. 1946).
Many of the above-cited cases fall short in one respect or another of all the criteria
listed in the text; nevertheless, they were all held sound investments by the court.
Usually some of the standard of care factors entered in; see note 81 infra.
Testimony by financial experts as to the soundness of securities is admissible.
Matter of Winburn, 140 Misc. 18, 249 N. Y. Supp. 758 (Surr. Ct. 1931) ; Chemical
Bank & Trust Co. v. Reynaud, 150 Misc. 821, 270 N. Y. Supp. 301 (Sup. Ct. 1933),
aff'd, 241 App. Div. 813, 265 N. Y. Supp. 944 (1st Dept. 1933), aff'd, 266 N. Y. 844,
195 N. E. 164 (1934).
78. Mattocks v. Moulton, 84 Me. 545, 24 At. 1004 (1892) ; Kimball v. Reding,
31 N. H. 352 (1855) ; see also Appeal of Dickinson, 152 Mass. 184, 25 N. E. 99 (1890).
79. Kinmouth v. Brigham, 5 Allen 270 (Mass. 1862). Although surcharge was
not involved, the court considered this question as though it were one of surcharge,

A RATIONALIZATION OF TRUST SURCHARGE CASES

"unsound" securities.8 "

Despite this rule, the courts have sometimes

appeared extraordinarily lenient in allowing retention 8" of, and in a
few cases investment in, some securities that do not appear to meet
the tests just outlined'. The explanation of this leniency must be found
primarily in the fixing of a lower standard of care for the particular
fiduciaries involved.
Even if the security itself is sound, it is still possible that the transaction will be deemed speculative.82 This depends upon whether its
purpose appears to the court to be primarily speculative. No matter
how good the faith of the trustee, he is not to try to make a "killing"
for his beneficiaries, but to be content with a normal income for the life
tenants and security of principal for the remaindermen. The most
notorious and frequently-criticized speculation in non-speculative
securities is the maintenance of a margin account.8 3 Yet even this

conduct is not necessarily speculative, its propriety depending upon the
exigencies of the situation under which the fiduciary acted.8"
and held the trading partnership interest too speculative; in fact, the speculative character of the enterprise loomed so large in the court's mind that it overbalanced the
fact that this was a retention of an investment in which decedent*had been particularly interested. The decision was sound, but as so often happens, it led to language
which does not represent the law. The court, having made up its mind that the retention was improper, said, at page 278:
". ..
if the investment is not such as this Court would sustain them in making, it should not be allowed to continue, but should be converted."
As we have seen, many cases in Massachusetts have denied the validity of this dictum.
Proper analysis by the court would have been: this was an investment of the decedent,
and therefore the burden on the beneficiaries to show negligence is fairly heavy,
though not so heavy as it would be had there been a discretionary power; by showing
that the investment was totally inappropriate for a trust they have met that burden.
80. In re Cook's Trust Estate, 20 Del. Ch. 123, 171 AtI. 730 (Ch. 1934) ; Hanscom
v. Marston, 82 Me. 288, 19 Atl. 460 (1890) ; McInnes v. Whitman, 313 Mass. 19, 46
N. E. 2d 527 (1943) ; Matter of Cady, 211 App. Div. 373, 207 N. Y. Supp. 385 (4th
Dept. 1925) ; Lewis' Estate, 344 Pa. 586, 26 A. 2d 445 (1942).
Somewhat different situations are presented by Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353,
175 N. E. 761 (1931) and Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518, 121 Atl. 310 (1923). The
former was a wasting asset case; in the latter the trustees purchased bonds at a premium, then held them to maturity. In both instances the life tenants were benefited
at the expense of the remaindermen, and the court surcharged because the investment
was "unsound" from the standpont of protection of corpus. Proper accounting practices should have solved both problems.
81. In It; re McCann's Will, 212 Minn. 233, 3 N. W. 2d 226 (1942), the court
relied in part upon the soundness of the companies involved, but it is unlikely that they
would have been considered sufficiently safe to qualify as a "normal" trust investment.
Accord, Fairleigh v. Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co., 335 Mo. 360, 73 S. W. 2d
248 (1934) ; Dempster's Estate, 308 Pa. 153, 162 AtI. 447 (1932).
82. See Shattuck, The Massachusetts Prudent Matt it; Trust Investments, 25 B. U.
L. Rav. 307, 334 (1934).
83. Mathews v. Sheehan, 76 Conn. 654, 57 Atl. 694 (1904); Matter of Hirsch,
116 App. Div. 367, 101 N. Y. Supp. 893 (1st Dept. 1906), aff'd, 188 N. Y. 584, 81 N. E.
1165 (1907) ; Mellier's Estate, 312 Pa. 157, 167 Atl. 358 (1933).
84. See Reiley v. Healey, 122 Conn. 64, 187 At1. 661 (1936). Loans continued or
taken over in order to retain securities in periods of depression have been upheld in
Peck v. Searle, 117 Conn. 573, 169 Atl. 602 (1934) ; Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328,
89 N. E. 381 (1909) ; Gardner's Estate, 323 Pa. 229, 185 Atl. 804 (1936) ; and Jenks'
Estate, 19 Pa. D. & C. 479 (0. Ct. 1933).
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(d) What was the state of the market?
This issue never seems to arise as an original investment problem,
but always as one of undue retention, where a security (usually in
decedent's portfolio, but sometimes purchased earlier by the trustee)
was retained hopefully in a steadily falling market, 5 or a market that
dropped suddenly."6 The courts have always given weight to this
factor, and to the fact of a general depression, in which the market
appears not to be reflecting accurately the intrinsic value of the securities being held.87
Some investment experts will say, with considerable logic, that a
stock that is not sound to buy at a given price should not be retained
at that price. Human nature does not seem to work that way,"8 however, and the sympathy of the courts, equally noticeable in prudent
man and legal list states, is quite understandable. Where a stock was
being recommended for purchase at 100, and the next day, without
anything apparent having happened to the corporation, it is suddenly
selling at 70, it seems harsh to demand that the fiduciary give up hope
and at once "bail out" before it goes any lower. Unless something
happens to the corporation, he is usually protected; and if something
does happen, it usually is reflected in the market price so soon that
the trustee still cannot get what he considers a fair price. What this
judicial attitude really represents is merely an illustration, in a specific
type of case, of a refusal to apply hindsight.
(e) Under the circumstances of the case, was diversification required?
Although there have always been some investment experts who
have denied the soundness of a policy of diversification, it seems to be
generally accepted that diversification is a sound investment principle.8 9
85. Bowker v. Pierce, 130 Mass. 262 (1881) ; First National Bank of Boston v.
Truesdale Hospital, 288 Mass. 35, 192 N. E. 150 (1934) ; Kimball v. Whitney, 233
Mass. 321, 123 N. E. 665 (1919) ; Green v. Crapo, 181 Mass. 55, 62 N. E. 956 (1902) ;
Matter of Clark, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (1931) ; Matter of Balfe, 152 Misc.
739, 274 N. Y. Supp. 284 (Surr. Ct. 1934), mod., 245 App. Div. 22, 280 N. Y. Supp.
128 (2d Dept. 1935) ; Allis' Estate, 191 Wisc. 23, 209 N. W. 945 (1926).
86. North Adams National Bank v. Curtiss, 278 Mass. 471, 180 N. E. 217 (1932);
Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 175 N. E. 761 (1931) ; Quinn's Estate, 342 Pa. 509,
21 A. 2d 78 (1941) ; Clay's Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C. 257 (0. Ct. 1936) ; O'Brien's Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C. 501 (0. Ct. 1933). See also Seaman's Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 364,
5 A. 2d 208, 212 (1939), where the court said, "A fiduciary is not compelled to jettison
seasoned investments during a temporary panic."
87. Peck v. Searle, 117 Conn. 573, 169 Atl.. 602 (1933) ; Matter of Estate of
Weston, 91 N. Y. 502 (1883) ; Gardner's Estate, 323 Pa. 229, 185 Atl. 804 (1936).
88. Most investment advice does not work that way either. Any investment service will contain recommendations to retain stocks that the same service is not placing
in a "Buy" category.
89. The theory of diversification is that hard times might come to one company,
one industry, or one section of the country, that there might be a drastic slump in
equities when secured obligations do not suffer so severely, or that in an inflation the
holder of common stocks would be somewhat protected while secured obligations suffered by their comparative immobility. Accordingly, the diversifying investor will
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However, it is a far cry from that to the proposition that a fiduciary
who follows a different view should be surcharged for loss. Most of
the legal list and some of the prudent man states have refused to take
this step, and have held that failure to diversify is no evidence of negligence. ° In most prudent man states, however, diversification is at
least theoretically required. This theoretical requirement is actually
enforced in cases in which the fiduciary is making an investment."
Where, however, he is retaining decedent's investment, the courts
have found one way or another to absolve him from liability for loss.92
The reason for this practical difference must go back to the standard
of care factors. In the retention cases, there is not only the factor of
normally be found with some bonds, some preferred stock, some common stock, and
perhaps something else; in addition, the securities will be divided among different industries and among companies operating in different sections of the country.
90. Matter of Adriance, 145 Misc. 345, 260 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Surr. Ct. 1932);
Saeger Estates, 340 Pa. 73, 16 A. 2d 19 (1940) ; Security Trust Co. v. Appleton, 303
Ky. 328, 197 S. W. 2d 70 (1946) ; lit re McCann's Will, 212 Minn. 233, 3 N. W. "2d
226 (1942).
There is some logic behind a distinction between legal list and prudent man rules
on this point. In "legal list" states, the fiduciary is theoretically bound to purchase
such high grade investments that risk of loss is at a minimum, and diversification is
designed to cut down the risk of loss. A beneficiary could hardly be heard to contend, for example, that a trustee who had invested entirely in U. S. bonds was taking
an unreasonable risk by not diversifying. This reasoning would not apply so forcefully to real estate mortgages, and should not apply at all where a discretionary power
is involved. In that case there is no valid reason for distinction between the two rules,
yet the distinction seems to persist even there.
91. Appeal of Dickinson, 152 Mass. 184, 25 N. E. 99 (1890) (but note that partial
reliance is placed upon unsoundness of security) ; Appeal of Davis, 183 Mass. 499, 67
N. E. 604 (1903) ; see Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 89 N. E. 381 (1909).
In New England Trust Co. v. Paine, 317 Mass. 542, 59 N. E. 2d 263 (1945), 320
Mass. 482, 70 N. E. 2d 6 (1946), the court twice grappled with the diversification
problem. It pointed out that an original investment in the early part of the century
in New England railroad stock was proper in itself; that a disproportionately large
investment was probably improper, though in a different category from a purchase
of more speculative stock in the same degree. The trustee was finally upheld because
of an exculpatory clause. The first opinion infers at p. 555 that a retention of the
securities even though in a disproportionate amount might be treated differently.
92. First National Bank of Boston v. Truesdale Hospital, 288 Mass. 35, 192 N. E.
150 (1934) (direction in will-court also mentioned that other stocks had fallen proportionately, but did not mention what bonds had done) ; North Adams National Bank
v. Curtiss, 278 Mass. 471, 180 N. E. 217 (1932) (exculpatory clause, interest of decedent) ; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw, 261 Mass. 158, 158 N. E. 530 (1927) (clause
in will); Warmack v. Crawford, 195 S. W. 2d 919 (Mo. 1946) (discretionary clause
plus interest of decedent).
In Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446 (Mass. 1831), 50% of the trust was
in maiufacturing stocks, and the problem of diversification was not even mentioned.
Though often spoken of as an investment case, because there was a selection by the
trustees of securities in the decedent's estate, it still represents a retention of the decedent's investments.
In re Ward's Estate, 121 N. J. Eq. 555, 192 Atl. 68 (Prerog. Ct. 1936), aff'd, 121
N. J. Eq. 606, 191 Atl. 772 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937) is apparently contra. As in Harvard College v. Amory, the trustee was selecting for the trust securities that were in
the estate. However, the court actually held that a retention statute did not apply,
and that this should be treated as a new investment. In addition, the court was influenced by the lack of care shown by the trustee.
Scott, in ScoTT, TRuSTS, § 230.3 (1939) says that the trustee is under a duty to
sell to diversify. The only case he cites for this proposition, however, is Matter of
Toel, 180 Misc. 447, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 898 (Surr. Ct. 1943), where there was a specific
direction to diversify.
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retention rather than investment, but practically always there is the
background of the decedent, 3 and often there is also a power to retain.
A combination of these factors gives the beneficiary an uphill battle,
and a trustee who would probably be surcharged for an investment of
the same volume in the same securities is allowed to retain without
liability. Naturally, a case can be stated where there would be liability
for failure to diversify decedent's investment. This would mean only
that the beneficiaries had met their heavy burden, and had shown that
the trustee was so negligent that he should be surcharged despite the
presence of the favorable standard of care factors.
(f) What were the opportunitiesfor selling at a fair price?
This question involves the problem of blockage, which comes
up only rarely. Obviously if a fiduciary wants to sell, and tries to sell,
but because of a narrow or nonexistent market cannot sell, he should
not be held liable for his failure to do the impossible. This would be
94
practically an absolute defense.
The more normal situation is one wherein the securities could be
sold but, because of the narrow market, an apparent sacrifice would
have to be made. It is not unusual to see a wide spread between bid
and asked prices, or to be able to get bids (for stock in closely-held
corporations) only through private sources. Where a trust has a
large amount of such stock,* the trustee would have to sell at a substantial discount from what the market price for a very small lot
would be, and this is taken into account by the courts in determining
the wisdom of the trustee's decision.95
C. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

We have now taken up all the important factors which have been
considered by the courts in arriving at a decision as to whether, under
all the circumstances, a fiduciary was negligent in his administration
93. It is practically impossible to imagine a diversification-retention case in which
the background of the decedent does not play an important part. If he was not active
in the company he at least had to have placed great confidence in it as an investor or
there would not have been a disproportionate amount of it left in his estate. The only
case where this would not apply would be one in which the decedent had left a diversified portfolio and the executors' had sold all except one or two securities to meet
estate obligations.
94. In re Ward's Estate, 121 N. J. Eq. 555, 192 AtI. 68 (Prerog. Ct. 1936), aff'd,
121 N. J. Eq. 606, 191 Atl. 772 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937) ; Miller's Estate, 345 Pa. 91,
26 A. 2d 320 (1942) ; Reinhard's Estate, 322 Pa. 325, 185 Atl. 298 (1936) ; O'Brien's
Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C. 501 (0. Ct. 1933) ; see Dempster's Estate, 308 Pa. 153, 162 Atl.
447 (1932).
95. Crisman v. Cornell University, 132 N. J. Eq. 178, 27 A. 2d 627 (Ch. 1942);
Glauser Estate, 350 Pa. 192,'38 A. 2d 64 (1944) ; Quinn's Estate, 342 Pa. 509, 21 A.
2d 78 (1941) ; Dauler's Estate, 247 Pa. 356, 93 At. 511 (1915) ; Matter of Andrews,
239 App. Div. 32,. 265 N. Y. Supp. 386 (2d Dept. 1933). See also Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Copeland, 39 R. I. 193, 98 Atl. 273 (1916).
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of an estate or trust. These factors can eventually be boiled down into
one question--did he use that measure of care required of him by the
law? This simple statement again brings us back to the analogy of
the negligence case, where the answer to the same question will give
the answer to at least prima facie liability. However, also as in the
negligence case, it is possible for a fiduciary who is apparently liable
to surcharge to plead an affirmative defense and, if he can support this
plea, escape liability. It should be noted, however, that even an
affirmative defense properly proved is not absolute insurance against
liability. Bad faith or sometimes reckless indifference to the interests
of the beneficiaries would be sufficient to overcome it.
(1) Acquiescence amounting to estoppel
As pointed out earlier,9 6 acquiescence is sometimes used, or apparently used, to lower the standard of care. In its true form it is
supposed to operate as an estoppel and is a complete defense against
all acquiescing parties, no defense at all against anybody else."T The
classic case would be one in which all the beneficiaries, with full knowledge of all the facts, signified in writing their approval of a course of
action (either retention or purchase of the securities) which had been
agreed upon between them and the fiduciary. Usually the evidence
falls short of this, but it must always contain the two basic elements:
knowledge and approval.
Knowledge is best shown by letter or other documentary evidence,"' although oral testimony is admissible,99 and it has been held
that proof of the regular receipt of monthly statements, showing all
transactions, as to both income and principal, will suffice. 0 0 Agreement of the beneficiaries is usually shown by proof of some kind of
positive action. 1 1 Some cases have held that silence with knowledge
103
suffices, 10 2 but there is a split of authority on this point.
96. See pp. 661-662 supra.
97. See Mclnnes v. Whitman, 313 Mass. 19, 46 N. E. 2d 527 (1943).
98. Clabby's Estate, 338 Pa. 305, 12 A. 2d 71 (1940) ; Shipley's Estate (No. 1),
337 Pa. 571, 12 A. 2d 343 (1940) ; Stephens' Estate, 320 Pa. 97, 181 Ati. 559 (1935).
99. Linnard's Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C. 143 (0. Ct. 1931).
100. Curran's Estate, 17 Pa. D. & C. 435 (0. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 312 Pa. 416, 167 Atl.
597 (1933) ; see Clabby's Estate, 338 Pa. 305, 12 A. 2d 71 (1940).
101. Clabby's Estate, 338 Pa. 305, 12 A. 2d 71 (1940) ; Stephens' Estate, 320 Pa.
97, 181 Atl. 559 (1935) ; Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 135 Atl. 112 (1926).
102. Green v. Crapo, 181 Mass. 55, 62 N. E. 956 (1902) ; Shipley's Estate (No.
1), 337 Pa. 571, 12 A. 2d 343 (1940) ; Curran's Estate, 17 Pa. D. & C. 435 (0. Ct.
1932), af'd, 312 Pa. 416, 167 Atl. 597 (1933) ; Maser's Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C. 559
(0. Ct. 1934).
103. It re Cook's Trust Estate, 20 Del. Ch. 123, 171 Atl. 730 (Ch. 1934),
lays down a very rigid set of rules concerning acquiescence. Under this case, it is
necessary that the beneficiary know all the facts, be apprised of his legal rights, be
under no disability and act freely, deliberately and advisedly, with the intention of confirming a transaction which he knew or ought to have known was questionable. See
also White v. Sherman, 168 Ill. 589, 48 N. E. 128 (1897) ; In re Shaw, 122 N. J. Eq.
536, 194 AtI. 545 (Prerog. Ct. 1937).
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Although the courts speak of acquiescence operating as an estoppel, all the elements of true estoppel do not necessarily have to be
made out. Rarely is reliance by the fiduciary shown, and it does not
even seem to be necessary that the acquiescence precede the action
later complained of.'0° To this extent, the estoppel language used
by the courts is faulty. Where the acquiescence precedes the action,
some kind of reliance might be presumed, but where it follows the
action, under such circumstances that a defense of laches cannot be
made out, there is really no theory on which a true estoppel can be
based, and about all that can be said is that there was ratification. It
is probably for this reason that the courts practically always mention
other factors along with acquiescence in refusing to surcharge.
(2) Laches
The defense of laches is the same in a trust surcharge case as it
is in any other case.' 5 It is an equitable defense which requires proof
that the complaining party, with knowledge of the facts, delayed enforcing his rights for an unconscionable period with resulting detriment
to the other party. It thus differs from acquiescence, though both
06
spring from the same basic principle of equity.
(3) An exculpatory clause in the trust instrument
Superficially, this would seem to be merely an extraordinarily
broad discretionary power, and sometimes it seems to be considered in
that way."' When it is so treated, it becomes just a particularly
strong standard of care factor. Properly analyzed, a discretionary
power and exculpatory clause are entirely different in nature. A
normal discretionary power says, in effect, "You have discretion to
do X, Y or Z." The fiduciary thus is allowed greater scope of operation, and will normally be surcharged only for something akin to gross
negligence so long as he stays within the boundaries of his power. If
he steps beyond these boundaries, the power loses all its force.
An exculpatory clause, on the other hand, gives no discretion, no
specific power. It says, in effect, "If you do what you should not do,
you are still not to be held liable." This is not an enlargement of
104. See Shipley's Estate (No. 1), 337 Pa. 571, 12 A. 2d 343 (1940) ; Maser's
Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C. 559 (0. Ct. 1934).
105. Phillips v. Rogers, 12 Metc. 405 (Mass. 1847) ; see Pollack v. Bowman, 139
N. J. Eq. 47, 49 A. 2d 881 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946) ; Coggins' Appeal, 3 Walker 426
(Pa. 1881) ; ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 219 (1939).
106. This is well brought out by the Maine court in Rodick v. Pineo, 120 Me. 160,
113 At. 45 (1921).
107. Warmack v. Crawford, 195 S. W. 2d 919 (Mo. 1946) ; see It re Carr's Estate, 355 Pa. 438, 50 A. 2d 330 (1947) ; Appeal of Chaplin, 131 Me. 446, 163 Atl. 774
(1933).
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power, but a limitation of liability. As such it is more in the nature
of an affirmative defense than a factor bearing on the Standard of care.
This clause is most frequently found in wills drawn in prudent man
states, because of the prevailing feeling that any lesser clause adds
little to the normal discretionary powers of the fiduciary. The clause,
where recognized as being more than a discretionary power, is a good
defense against negligence,' though public policy prohibits it from
operating as a defense against bad faith, and probably against a reckless
disregard of the beneficiaries' interests. 10 9
CONCLUSION

An analysis of the cases wherein it is sought to surcharge trustees
reveals that the foregoing factors are those which are accorded most
weight by the courts. There is discernible in such an analysis a
pattern not heretofore apparent in the generalities of opinion and text.
An application of this approach to new factual situations could
profitably be made by those affected intimately by the surcharge
problem. For the practitioner faced with the necessity of marshalling
a large and assorted mass of decisions from many jurisdictions, a
rationalization can be made out of seeming chaos. To the fiduciary
seeking to determine the permissible limits of behavior in the conduct
of his duties, the analysis should prove useful in pointing up the details
of administration which courts will examine.
108. New England Trust Co. v. Paine, 317 Mass. 542, 59 N. E. 2d 263 (1945),
320 Mass. 482, 70 N. E. 2d 6 (1946) ; North Adams National Bank v. Curtiss, 278
Mass. 471, 180 N. E. 217 (1932) ; see Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N. E. 647

(1930). Surprisingly, even in these cases the courts go to great pains to point out
other factors which favor the fiduciary. So, although the affirmative defense theory
is sound, the courts still like to have as many other factors as possible to rely upon.
109. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 222 (1935). See Tavenner v. Baughmann, 41 S. E.
2d 703 (W. Va. 1947), where the clause was not enough to provide immunity where
there was an unlawful delegation of duty.

